Clausewitz and *la pensée 68*¹

**Éric Alliez**
Université Paris 8

**Maurizio Lazzarato**

Translated by Ames Hodges and Katharine Wallerstein

In the aftermath of the Second World War and its erasure of the borders between wartime and peacetime, revolutionary movements remained dependent on Leninist theories and practices to grasp the new relationship between war and capital. Inserting the cycle of struggles that crisscrossed the 1960s into this “mandatory” revolutionary hypothesis failed in the end to think war on the level of the “68” event, which united all parts of the world in what has been called a “cold civil war.”²

In the 1970s, “professional revolutionaries” were therefore not the ones who engaged in a new problematization of war. As the discourse of crisis flourished (in the thermonuclear age, “the hour of truth is crisis, not war”) in seeming opposition to the discourse of “protracted war” taking up the Maoist refrain of a “generalized Clausewitzian strategy,”³ it was Michel Foucault, on the one hand, and Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, on the other, who produced a radical break in the conception of war and of its constitutive relationship with capitalism. Unique examples in the critical thinking of the time, they took up the confrontation with Carl von Clausewitz to reverse the famous formula: war is not the continuation of politics (which determines its ends); politics is on the contrary an element, a strategic modality of the whole constituted by war. The ambition of *la pensée 68* was asserted in not making of the reversal a simple permutation of its terms. It was a question of developing a radical critique of the concepts of “war” and “politics” as presupposed by Clausewitz’s formula: *war must be a continuation of politics by other means.*⁴

In accordance with his genealogical perspective, Foucault sought to base the reasons for this reversal on a strategic reconstruction of what Marx called primitive accumulation, and was very hesitant to approach the period of so-called “total” wars. Deleuze and Guattari, on the other hand, directly attacked the relationship between war and capitalism in the twentieth century, and in particular in the period after World War II.

This problematization of war was strictly dependent on a new concept of capitalism and the struggles that opposed it in the post-war period, all of which crystallized in the strange revolution of

¹ This text is adapted from Alliez and Lazzarato, *Guerres et Capital*, chapter 11.

² This text is adapted from Alliez and Lazzarato, *Guerres et Capital*, chapter 11.
1968. One must therefore simultaneously hold that Foucault’s “micro-physics” of power is a modality of “generalized civil war,” and that the “micro-politics” of Deleuze and Guattari are indissociable from their very original concept of “war machine.” If one isolates the analysis of the power from generalized civil war, as does Foucauldian critique, the theory of governmentality tends to be no more than a variant of neoliberal “governance”; and if one separates the micropolitics from the war machine, as does Deleuzian critique, what remains are but “minorities” powerless against capital, which maintains its lead.

The Distinction and Reversibility of Power and War in Michel Foucault

La pensée 68 therefore produced two different but complementary versions of the formula that radically displaced the Clausewitzian point of view focused on the state. Foucault approached the formula from a completely new problematization of the question of power, while Deleuze and Guattari carried out the reversal through an analysis of the nature of the movements of capital.

Between 1971 and 1976, Foucault problematized the reversal of Clausewitz’s formula by reestablishing the reality of “civil war” as the condition for the effective intelligibility of power relations. The renewal of the question of power that he carried out when he conceived of politics as a continuation of war was thus undertaken starting from “the most condemned of wars, … civil war,” which Clausewitz had excluded from his treatise On War, even as it was identified by Fichte as that “absolute war” (absolute Krieg) which he would borrow from Clausewitz. The civil war is for Foucault the matrix of all strategies of power, and thus consequently for all struggles against power.

The reversal of Clausewitz’s formula was accompanied by a distancing from three classic concepts of war. “Neither Hobbes, nor Clausewitz, nor class struggle,” wrote Foucault in a 1972 letter. Unlike Hobbes, for whom it is never a question of real wars, power does not come after civil war; it does not succeed conflict as its pacification. Conversely, civil war is not the result of the dissolution of power. Civil war is the “permanent state” of capitalism. Civil war therefore has nothing to do with the Hobbesian fiction of the exacerbated individualism of the “war of all against all” projected into the state of nature. On the contrary, it is always a question of confrontation between qualified collective entities, such as: “the war of rich against poor, of owners against those who have nothing, of bosses against proletarians.” Far from being that moment of atomic disintegration requiring the intervention of a constitutive and pacifying mediation (the sovereign as founding principle of the social body), civil war is the very process through which new communities and their institutions are established. It is not limited to being the expression of a temporally limited, constitutive power since it is always at work. Division, conflict, civil war, and stasis structure and unstructure power; they form “a matrix within which elements of power come to function, are reactivated, break up.”

Absolute monarchy and liberalism come together in the obligation to deny the existence of civil war to assert the juridical subject and/or the economic subject. “The assertion that civil war does not exist is one of the first axioms of the exercise of power.” But political economy is the “science par excellence of this denial. It claims to be a double negation: negation of war and negation of sovereignty, where economic interests and individual egotism replace warring passions, while the self-regulation of the invisible hand makes the sovereign useless and superfluous. In liberal ideology,
capitalism needs neither war nor the state.

Nor would Foucauldian civil war find a place in Clausewitz’s inter-state war, because it cannot be reduced to war as a pure act of sovereignty and balancing mechanism between European states. It is both the object and the subject of the microphysics of power and the macrophysics of populations: “One should be able to study the daily exercise of power as a civil war: to exercise power is to conduct civil war in a certain way, and it ought to be possible to analyze all these instruments, tactics, alliances that we can identify in terms of civil war.”

While Clausewitz’s point of view is that of the state (hence the always possible Hegelianization of the treaty), Foucault proposes to pursue a radical critique of the state in reversing the formula.

In producing his formula, Clausewitz “did no more than observe a mutation that was actually established at the start of the seventeenth century, [with the constitution] of the new diplomatic reason, the new political reason, at the time of the treaty of Westphalia.” Clausewitz thus conceptualized in his own way the expropriation and appropriation by the state of the different war machines that raged during the feudal era (“private war”) by means of their centralization and professionalization in an army. The state makes war a state affair (étatise la guerre), waging war outside its borders to increase state power in a context regulated by the constitution of international law at the initiative of European states. But in this peace within which the organization of states and the legal structure of power prevailed, one still hears the sound of a muted war that was the object, “at the very moment when this transformation occurs (or perhaps immediately afterward),” of a discourse that was “very different from the philosophico-juridical discourse that had been habitually spoken until then. And the historico-political discourse [on society] that appeared at this moment was … a discourse on war, which was understood to be a permanent social relationship, the ineradicable basis of all relations and institutions of power.”

Political power therefore does not begin at the end of the war that it brings to an end; it is war that drives institutions and political order and that must become (again) the analyzer of power relations. Hence the reversal of the reversal of Clausewitz’s formula: the problem no longer being to reverse Clausewitz’s principle, which subordinates war to politics, but to understand the principle that Clausewitz himself reversed to the benefit of the state …

If, in the middle of the 1970s, he was “curiously close” to Marxism in many ways, Foucault did not fail to point out its strategic weakness. In the concept of class struggle, Marxists put the emphasis on class rather than struggle. This explains the slippery slope that threatens to send Marxism into a sociology of social classes or into the economism of “production and labor.” Class struggle is therefore by no means another name for Foucauldian civil war. The latter is a “generalized civil war” that cannot be reduced to the capital/labor relationship alone. It concerns society as a whole. It involves a multiplicity of “subjects,” domains, and knowledge. It is, first, a “war of subjectivities” irreducible to the dialectical, “historical constitution of a universal subject, a reconciled truth, and a right in which all particularities have their ordained place” according to a logic that is more totalizing than contradictory. “The Hegelian dialectic and all those that came after it must,” Foucault concludes, “be understood as philosophy and right’s colonization and authoritarian colonization of a historico-political discourse that was both a statement of fact, a proclamation, and a practice of social warfare.” The irreducibility of social warfare to the class struggle that pacifies it conditions the analysis of political power as war.
According to Foucauldian *doxa*, the 1977-1978 seminar, *Security, Territory, Population*, marked a major shift in the philosopher’s thought, characterized by the abandonment of the hypothesis of war in favor of that of governmentality. This shift will take definitive shape with the lectures given at the Collège de France in 1978-1979: *The Birth of Biopolitics*. But we would like to draw attention to a text published two years before Foucault’s death, “The Subject and Power” (1982), which retracts the entire path of his work and can be considered his theoretical-political will and testament. The famous definition of governmentality as action on an action, as structuring the “field of action of others,” continues with the refusal to consider relationships of power through the warring model (of confrontation) or the juridical one (referring to state sovereignty).

Yet Foucault establishes for the first time in this text a distinction between *power* and *war*, one that was suggested in *The Will to Knowledge* (1976), at the conclusion of a strategic analysis of power (“power … is the name that one attributes to a complex strategical situation in a particular society”), where he returned to the question of whether there was a need to revisit Clausewitz’s formula and say that “politics is war pursued by other means.” He answered: “If we still wish to maintain a separation between war and politics, perhaps we should postulate rather that this multiplicity of force relations can be coded in part but never totally—either in the form of ‘war,’ or in the form of ‘politics,’ this would imply two different strategies (*but the one always liable to switch into the other*) for integrating these unbalanced, heterogeneous, unstable, and tense force relations.” This is the line of thought he would return to in order to articulate that which was embedded in the lectures of 1972-1976 and which he now thought of in terms of a difference in nature between *relationships of power* (disciplinary, security, and governmental relationships) and *strategic confrontations*. Largely overlooked by Foucauldian critique, the last part of the 1982 article in fact carries the title “Relations of power and relations of strategy.” Although Foucault did not take it up again, the distinction made in these few pages seems to us to be of the utmost importance. It shows that war and power, while distinct, are in a relationship of continuity and reversibility. Power relationships are of the type *governing/governed* and designate relationships between *partners*, whereas strategic confrontations oppose *adversaries*.

The establishment of a power relationship is both the objective of strategic confrontation and its suspension, since strategic relationships between adversaries are substituted with relationships of the governing/governed type. Liberals dream of seeing power apparatuses function automatically, on the model of Adam Smith’s invisible hand imposing itself on individuals like a necessity in the play of liberty and power. These “automatisms,” however, are first the *results* of war and its continuation by other means, such that war is always latent under disciplinary, governmental, and sovereignty relationships. Once power apparatuses ensure a certain continuity, predictability, and rationality of conduct of the governed, the inverse process can always occur, transforming the governed into adversaries, since there is no power without disobedience that escapes it, without struggles that defy the constraint of power and that once again open the possibility of “civil war.” “And in return,” Foucault emphasizes, “the strategy of struggle also constitutes a frontier,” a threshold that can be crossed toward war.

Perhaps what is most important to understand is that power and war, relations of power and strategic relationships, should not be seen as successive moments but as relationships that can
continuously be reversed and that, in fact, coexist. “In effect, between a relationship of power and a strategy of struggle there is a reciprocal appeal, a perpetual linking and a perpetual reversal. At every moment the relationship of power may become a confrontation between two adversaries. Equally, the relationship between adversaries in society may, at every moment, give place to the putting into operation of mechanisms of power.”

Whoever is interested today in the “new economy of power relations” should note that reversibility determines an “instability” that is not foreign to contemporary financial capitalism. “Crisis” does not follow “growth”; they coexist. Peace does not follow war; they are co-present. The economy does not replace war; it institutes another way of conducting it. The “crisis” is infinite and war only knows respite by incorporating the apparatus of power that it secures.

It is ultimately no longer a question of reversing the formula (politics is but the continuation of war by other means), but an interweaving of war within politics and politics within war that encompasses all the movements of capitalism. Politics is no longer, as in Clausewitz, the politics of the state, but a politics of the financialized economy interwoven in the multiplicity of wars that together constitute a war of destruction: wars of race, class, and gender, and ecological wars that provide the global “environment” for all the others.

In short, in its actual practices, or, as Foucault puts it, in its “concrete practices,” governmentality does not replace war. It organizes, governs, and controls the reversibility of wars and power. Governmentality is the governmentality of wars, and without it the new concept, placed too hastily at the service of eliminating all the “conducts” of war, inevitably resonates with the all-powerful and very (neo)liberal concept of “governance.”

We must, however, recognize that this tendency towards misadventure, as witnessed in most “governmentality studies,” has a name—The Birth of Biopolitics—and a date—1978-1979—in the Foucauldian corpus. Here the market recovers its status as the enterprise of negation of civil war through a (neo)liberal utopia that does not give way without the transport of Deleuze, of Deleuze and Guattari in the enterprise of Hayek. … Yet this is also what makes “The Subject and Power” more interesting, as it reconnected in 1982 with the most leftist vein of characterization of post-'68 struggles (“transversal” struggles against the effects of power-knowledge, and so forth) in the first lesson of “Society Must be Defended” (1976), to give them a theoretical outlet in the analysis of power relations through the confrontation of strategies.

The War Machine of Deleuze and Guattari

The reversal of Clausewitz’s formula by Deleuze and Guattari is inscribed in the framework of universal history and the world-economy. The strategy they used is therefore very different from Foucault’s analysis which, while producing a radical critique of the state, remained paradoxically prisoner of its territoriality (generalized civil war of/in the European nation-state). Deleuze and Guattari developed an absolutely original theory dissociating war and the state from the “war machine.” State capture of the war machine effectively makes war its object by subordinating it to the political ends of the state that monopolizes it. The state is Clausewitzian.

The institutionalization of the war machine by the state operates a disciplinarization and
professionalization amply described by Foucault as one of the most important sources of disciplinary
techniques. This is the importance of the army as administration of discipline on productive bodies
and, with the labor force territorialized or sedentarized by military force, throughout the entire social
field. But the process of capture and institutionalization/professionalization of the war machine
by the state is far from linear. The military institution is a social reality crossed by always possible
tensions and reversals. Capture of the war machine is never once and for all; it can always escape the
state apparatus as a foreign body (a military proletariat).

The non-linear process of “capture of the war machine” reveals itself to be very useful for
historicizing the relationship between war, capital, and the state. In fact, while the disjunction
that becomes inclusive between state and war machine is the condition of possibility of Nazi
subordination of the first to the second in the form–Party feeding the autonomy (and the ontonomy)
of a war goal without end, the return to the exclusive disjunction between state and war machine
opens the possibility of the appropriation of the latter by revolutionary forces outside the (Leninist)
form of the Party. “Guerrilla warfare, minority warfare, revolutionary and popular war … can make
war only on the condition that they simultaneously create something else.”21 If more detail is needed:
doing something else at the same time does not at all mean ignoring or neglecting real war but
creating collectively the means to oppose it, undo it, winning by doing it another way—because
“every creation is brought about by a war machine.”

In his 1979–1980 courses contemporary with the writing of A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze
undertakes an analysis of the nature of war and its transformation through the dynamic of capital
that strictly conditions the reversal of Clausewitz’s formula. The philosopher endeavors to show that
the same movement drives capital and war when war is industrial war. The contradictions of capital
and the contradictions of war then tend to harmonize. The demonstration unfolds starting from a
surprising Marx/Clausewitz relationship. The different moments of this development are not taken
up in A Thousand Plateaus, which is why it is interesting to reconstruct their logic here.

Deleuze starts by taking up the question of the limits of capital by returning—as he already
did in Anti-Oedipus—to the chapter on the “tendency of the rate of profit to fall” in Volume III of
Capital. The thesis is well-known: capital has limits, but those limits are immanent (immanenten
Schranken). And capital only approaches the limit to push it back.

This movement toward the limit that capitalism poses and reposes endlessly is deeply
contradictory. Capital is defined as an unlimited accumulation (production for production), and, at
the same time, this endless process must be for profit, for private property (production for capital),
such that the unlimited movement is subject to a restriction that makes it a limited movement. The
two movements of capital are inseparable since capital itself launches the deterritorialization of
production for production and its reterritorialization for private property and profit. This double
movement is the source of periodic “crises.” Any attempt to accelerate the unlimited movement
in the hope of cutting it from its territorialization in profit is destined to fail (this is the false
“revolutionary” solution proposed by accelerationism). How does one account for this contradiction?
And is there a capitalist mechanism capable of resolving it?

It is at this precise moment that Deleuze invokes Clausewitz. This allows him both to
establish the relationship that ties war to capital and to determine the historical impasses against
which Clausewitz’s theory falters when the war machine is appropriated by capital. Deleuze then pretends to ask whether it is “by chance” that he feels the need to return to the concepts of Clausewitz’s theory of war.

“Let’s return to a terminology that we needed for something else altogether, in other words in terms of the problem of war … Like capital, and this is probably the deepest tie between war and capital, … war has a goal and an objective. And the two are not the same.” Clausewitz, he recalls, distinguishes the political goal (Zweck) and the military objective (Ziel) of war. The military objective of war is defined by the reversal or annihilation of the adversary. The political goal of war is completely different, since it constitutes the end that a State gives itself when it enters into a war (to produce, as we know, a rebalancing of the “European equilibrium”). Deleuze notes here that Clausewitz is still describing the situation preceding the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars. “At that moment, the war machine was captured in the state, in fact, the military objective that relates to the war machine was subordinated to the political goal that relates to the political goal of the state that wages war. What happened when war started to become total?”

At the end of the nineteenth century, capital was no longer limited to passing through the state-form and its war machine for the needs of its own development. It would undertake a process of capture that was indistinguishable from the construction of its own war machine, of which the state and war were only components. This process accelerated with the First World War, which represented a radical break in the history of war in the sense that capital transmitted to war the infinite, or the unlimited movement that characterizes accumulation, by defining a “type of contradiction” between the objective of war and the goal of the state.

We can assign a tendency to total war at the moment when capitalism takes hold of the war machine and gives it a development, a fundamental material development … When war tends to become total, the objective and the goal tend to enter into a type of contradiction. There is tension between the objective and the goal. Because as war becomes total, the objective, or to use Clausewitz’s term, overcoming the adversary, no longer has any limits. The adversary can no longer be identified, assimilated with the fort to be captured, the enemy army to be defeated; it is the entire people and the entire land. In other words, the objective becomes unlimited, and that is total war.

By becoming unlimited, the military objective is no longer subordinated to the political goal of the state and tends to become autonomous. The war machine is no longer under state control, which introduces this “contradiction” that takes form in the Nazi and fascist war machines: they take the line of abolition of the movements without limits of war all the way. “In the development of capital, we find a problem that resonates with the possibility of contradiction between the limited political goal of war and the unlimited objective of total war.” The goal of capital (production for capital) is limited, while its objective (production for production) is unlimited. The limited goal and unlimited objective are therefore forced to enter into a contradiction for which Marx presents the expression in the chapter on the tendency of the profit rate to fall. “That’s part of the beauty of Marx’s text to show us that there is, in capitalism, a mechanism that works in such a way that the
contradiction between unlimited objective and limited goal, between production for production and production for capital, finds its resolution thanks to a typically capitalist process. This process is what Marx summarizes in the formula ‘periodical depreciation of capital and creation of new capital.’”

Through this mechanism, capital constantly resolves the contradiction at the same time as it proposes it in an expanded manner.

War resolves the contradiction between its limited goal and its objective that has become unlimited in a similar way; and, like capital, it only resolves it by expanding it. After almost escaping capital between the two world wars (fascisms), the war machine no longer took war as its objective, but rather “peace.” The Nazis had made the war machine autonomous from the state, “but they still needed this war machine to operate in wars … In other words, they kept something of the old formula, that war would be the materialization of the war machine. I do not mean that today it is not like that, the war machine pursues wars, we see it all the time, but something nevertheless changed, it also needs war but not in the same way. The following situation tends to happen, … the modern war machine would not even need to be materialized in real wars, since it would be war materialized itself. To put it another way, the war machine would not even need to have war as its object, since it finds its object in a peace of terror. It achieved its ultimate object *suiting its character as total* peace.”

“Peace” resolves the contradiction which it displaces by imposing it in an expanded form. But what is this expanded form? The war machine of the state that had carried out the management and organization of all wars coextensive/co-intensive with the entire history of capitalism did not become the war machine of capital without transforming “war” into what Carl Schmitt and Ernst Jünger, as early as the 1940s (they knew the Reich’s war was lost), and then Hannah Arendt and again Carl Schmitt, in the early 1960s, called “world civil war” or “global civil war.”

A war for which the political goal is immediately economic and the economic objective immediately political.

Taking its source in the “threatening peace of nuclear deterrence” and the analysis of it by Paul Virilio, the concept of “total peace” is an ambiguous one today. In fact, while the war machine of total peace is none other than the absolute unlimitedness of capitalist globalization itself, the assertion that war and peace have become indistinguishable is still reliant on the Clausewitzian opposition between war and peace as well as the European context that balances it. The reversal of the formula should rather affirm the continuity between war and politics, war and economy, war and welfare *in the constitutive multiplicity of war and wars* that mobilizes the entire planetary social environment by submitting it to a *total civil war in action*. All the modalities of war machines that the state appropriated for itself starting with primitive accumulation, and that it capitalized in its army and administration, in the post-war era carry out this “global civil war” waged directly by capital, which leads to the explosion of 1968.

“Peace” is not limited therefore to “peace that technologically frees the unlimited material process of total war” (the unbridled arms race, the military-scientific-industrial complex); it takes charge of integration policies on the global level, in other words the war of labor, the war of welfare, the war of internal colonization and external neo-colonization, and so forth. Peace becomes the means by which the war machine of capital “takes over a maximum of civil functions”—to such an extent that war “disappears.” But it only “disappears” because there was an “extension of its domain” by establishing a continuity between “financial, industrial, and military technological complexes.”
The reversal of Clausewitz’s formula only appears at this moment, according to Deleuze and Guattari (who curiously enough use the same expression in French as the one used by Foucault above: “apparaît seulement à ce moment,” “appears only at this moment”). It is only uttered from the perspective of power and the political state, of those states that no longer appropriate the war machine, that reconstitute a war machine of which they themselves are only technical parts. From the perspective of the “exploited,” however, the reversal of the formula has always already occurred in a manner of “historico-transcendental doublet” (Foucault) that defines and subjects them as such.

The double reversal of the formula operated by Foucault and Deleuze and Guattari appeared in a context of changing circumstances that marked the beginning of a new political sequence, where the war machine of capital alone dominated the period through its “creativity.” At the same time, the new theory of war and power was not able to confront and draw on real political experiments, since between the end of the 1970s and the early 1980s, the radicalization that resulted from ’68 (“Rampant May”) faded, weakened, and finally collapsed in the repetition of the modalities of civil war codified by the revolutions of the first half of the century around the October Revolution of the Bolsheviks. After the failure of insurrection movements, the “Winter Years” began, and have yet to end. The impetus of these formidable intuitions and the “insurrection of knowledge” in which they participated was cut short and fell into the political void of the period.

It is also the case that la pensée 68 did not prove capable of producing a strategic knowledge adequate to the civil wars that capital was able to start again as an overall response to its global destabilization, which reached its climax in 1968. Proof, if it were needed, that it is not enough to state that micropolitics has to pass into macropolitics to transform it (even though this is often forgotten): both micro- and macropolitics have to be included in the multiplicity of wars that take place there, without which both micro- and macropolitics collapse and the struggles occurring there lose their consistency in a “becoming-minor” of those who perhaps have the privilege of being able to content themselves with a logic of emancipation without revolution. “Make what you are fleeing flee,” said Deleuze and Guattari to distinguish between the schizo and the revolutionary.

About the Authors

Éric Alliez is a philosopher and Professor at Université Paris 8 and at the Centre for Research in Modern European Philosophy, Kingston University. He is the author of Capital Times (University of Minnesota Press, 1995), with a forward by Gilles Deleuze, The Brain-Eye: New Histories of Modern Painting (Rowman and Littlefield, 2016), and Undoing the Image (Urbanomic, 2017).

Maurizio Lazzarato is a sociologist and philosopher in Paris. He is the author of Signs and Machines: Capitalism and the Production of Subjectivity (Semiotext(e), 2014), and Governing by Debt (Semiotext(e), 2015).
Notes

1. With the expression *la pensée 68*, we focus on the “core” of contemporary French philosophy as it developed from 1968, in the *after-effect* of ’68, by thinking the “strange” or “impossible revolution of ’68”—strange and even impossible in relation to the Marxist-Leninist (i.e. dialectical) codification of “revolution” (centered around the working class as the subject of history). While not overlooking its emergence in the 1960s, we believe the reference to ’68 gives its full importance to the concept of the “event” for Deleuze and Guattari, Foucault, Lyotard, Rancière, Badiou, and so forth. For our Anglo-Saxon readers, we would also note that the “exporting” of *la pensée 68* as “French Theory” is not without connection to the global dimension of ’68, which could even be seen as the first appearance of an *alter-globalist* movement. All of these questions (which also carry the problem of the “limits” of *la pensée 68*) will be at the center of our second volume, *Wars and Revolution*.

2. Fontaine, *Guerre civile*.


4. *Translator’s note*: The standard translation of Clausewitz’s formula is “War is the continuation of politics by other means.”


8. Ibid., 32.


10. Ibid., 32.

11. Ibid., 388.


13. Ibid., 48.


16. Foucault, “Subject and Power.”


18. Ibid.

19. Ibid.

20. Ibid.; our emphasis.


22. Ibid., 230.


24. Ibid.

25. Ibid.

26. Ibid.

27. Ibid.

28. Ibid.


30. Ibid., p. 571, note 64.

31. Ibid., 466.

32. Ibid., 467.

33. Ibid., 465.

34. Ibid., 466.

35. This question will be at the heart of our second volume, *Wars and Revolution*.

Bibliography


Deleuze, Gilles. “Deleuze, Appareils d’États, et machines de guerres.” www.youtube.com/watch?v=kgWaov-IUrA.


